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DISCOVERY AND TESTIMONY OF
UNRETAINED EXPERTS: CREATING A
CLEAR AND EQUITABLE
STANDARD TO GOVERN
COMPLIANCE WITH SUBPOENAS
A litigant's attempt to discover information or compel testimony
from an unwilling nonparty expert would at one time have been an ex-
traordinary event.' In recent years, however, litigants have increasingly
sought to subpoena unretained experts.2 Some knowledgeable observers
fear this trend will continue as litigation becomes more complex and ex-
pert opinion increasingly important.3 The cases involving compelled ex-
pert testimony or discovery4 raise two issues: Should a nonparty expert
1. See, ag., Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Part One An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 936.
2. This note deals primarily with the treatment of a subclass of witnesses-experts who have
not been retained by the party seeking information and who have no role in the underlying events
being litigated. Although the term "expert" is inexact, the distinguishing characteristic of an expert
witness is some kind of specialized skill and knowledge. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (defining an expert
witness as a person with special '"knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" sufficient to
qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates). Professors Wright and Miller
have classified experts into four categories: (1) experts retained or specially employed to testify at
trial; (2) experts retained or employed to help prepare for trial but not to testify; (3) experts infor-
mally consulted in preparation for trial but not retained; and (4) experts whose information is not
acquired in preparation for trial. 8 C. WRIG T & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAtcCE AND PROCE-
DURE § 2029, at 250 (1970). Professor Graham has suggested the term "occurrence witness" to
describe experts who were actors in or contemporaneous viewers of events forming the basis of a
given lawsuit. Graham, supra note 1, at 941. Professor Maurer has extended this terminology and
has used the term "nonoccurrence witness" to describe those experts, retained or unretained, who
have not viewed or taken part in the events underlying the lawsuit. Maurer, Compelling the Expert
Witness: Fairness and Utility Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 GA. L. REV. 71, 83
(1984).
3. As one judge has stated: "With all the public funding presently available, in addition to the
private funds available to private litigants, and consequent expansion of litigation, unwilling experts
on school discrimination, environment and psychiatry, for example, as well as surgeons, could be
made subject to intermittent call." Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 823 (2d Cir. 1976)
(Gurfein, L, concurring).
4. See, e-g., Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1546-47 (11th Cir. 1985)
(defendant in product liability suit sought study on toxic shock syndrome); Deitchman v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 558 (7th Cir. 1984) (manufacturer sought study on female genital
cancers from university registry); Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir.
1983) (defendant sought data reports, lab notes, and other material related to safety defects in jeep);
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be compelled to comply with a subpoena? If so, what level of compensa-
tion is appropriate?
The present approach in this area is problematic in several respects.
Under existing rules, unretained experts can be forced to provide opin-
ions or the results of research, even though a litigant may be able to
obtain the information from another source.5 Such disclosure could
jeopardize the expert's ability to continue working in a given field. 6 Fur-
thermore, the unretained expert is often inadequately compensated for
the specialized information.7
The expert's situation is rendered more difficult by the fact that in
most jurisdictions a nonparty cannot appeal a discovery order in a civil
suit without first being held in contempt of court.8 Thus, an unretained
EEOC v. University of Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir. 1983) (party sought aca-
demic research); In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir.) (party sought
disclosure of sources of information contained in expert's newsletter), cert. denied, 459 US. 909
(1982); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1266 (7th Cir. 1982) (party sought studies and
records related to animal toxicity studies); Kaufman, 539 F.2d at 812 (government subpoenaed two
computer experts in connection with antitrust litigation); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529,
536 (2d Cir. 1972) (party subpoenaed nonparty expert who had testified on related matter at prior
trial), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973); In re J.A. Frates, No. M8-85 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1985)
(available on Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file) (party sought nonparty's business securities report for
information on specific company's stock); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577,
580-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (litigants sought to compel unretained and retained experts to testify and
provide discovery information in class action); Cantaline v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 103 F.R.D. 447,
450-52 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (party sought architectural blueprints and other information from nonparty
in asbestos product liability suit); Lampshire v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 94 F.R.D. 58, 60 (N.D. Ga.
1982) (tampon manufacturer sought personal information about participants in toxic shock syn-
drome study conducted by Center for Disease Control); Wright v. Jeep Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 872-
73 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (manufacturer subpoenaed underlying research for study in product liability
suit); Fitzpatrick v. Holiday Inns, Inc, 507 F. Supp. 979, 980 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (nonparty physician
subpoenaed); Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Titanium Metals Corp. of Am., 91 F.R.D. 84, 87-88
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (plaintiff in antitrust suit sought economic report prepared by independent experts
for Department of Defense); In re New York City Mn. Sec. Litig., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 842, 843
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (party sought to compel nonparty expert to provide documents that would divulge
trade secrets); City of Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 84 F.R.D. 420, 422-23 (D. Conn.
1979) (nonsettling plaintiff sought to force production of terms of settlement between coplaintiff and
defendant); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 389-90 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (party sought research information from nonparty professor in breach of contract and defama-
tion action); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 80-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (party
sought documents and correspondence from authors of medical newsletter); Karp v. Cooley, 349 F.
Supp. 827, 836 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (physician subpoenaed in medical malpractice case), aff'd, 493 F.2d
408 (5th Cir.), cerL denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 45.
6. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
8. See, eg., United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-33 (1971) (nonparty who has not been
held in contempt cannot appeal subpoena except when denial of immediate review "would render
impossible any review whatsoever"); DeMasi v. Weiss, 669 F.2d 114, 122 (3d Cir. 1982) ("A non-
party witness may not obtain appellate review of the mere issuance of a discovery order requiring
production of information or other action."); Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir.
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expert usually must either comply with the subpoena or face contempt
sanctions and then appeal. Moreover, the language in some decisions
casts doubt on a nonparty's right to object to the subpoena.9
The ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution in 198510 recom-
mending that Rule 4511 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be
amended to deal with this problem. The proposed amendment would
give standing to nonparties to object to the issuance of subpoenas and
would ensure that "a nonparty expert witness... not be required to give
opinion testimony without compensation."12
This note also advocates changing the Federal Rules to require
greater solicitude for the interests of persons compelled to provide infor-
mation in disputes in which they have no stake. The note suggests, how-
ever, that the ABA's proposed amendment does not go far enough.
Specifically, the amendment should also provide that litigants may com-
pel discovery or testimony fiom unretained experts only in certain lim-
ited circumstances.
The note begins by discussing how the present rules treat the com-
peting interests of litigants and nonparty experts who do not want to
participate in litigation.' 3 It demonstrates that the Federal Rules give
insufficient weight to the equitable considerations associated with objec-
tions to subpoenas directed at nonparty experts.14 It then explains how
existing remedies are inadequate.1 s After discussing alternative reform
proposals,' 6 the note concludes by recommending that Rule 45 be
amended to extend to nonparty experts protection similar to that enjoyed
by attorneys under the work-produce doctrine.' 7 The proposed amend-
ment offers a clear standard for weighing the competing policies of pro-
tecting nonparty experts from unnecessary intrusions and providing a
1976) ("The remedy of the party wishing to appeal is to refuse to answer and subject himself to
criminal contempt; that of the non-party witness is to refuse to answer and subject himselfto civil or
criminal contempt."). But see Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1973)
(discovery orders may be appealed in certain instances involving executive privileges); Covey Oil Co.
v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 996-97 (10th Cir.) (motion by nonparty to quash subpoena was
appealable due to need to protect possible disclosure of trade secret), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 964
(1965).
9. Report to the House of Delegates, 1985 A.B.A. SEc. LrrG. 8-9.
10. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATIOi- HOUSE OF DELEGATES, FORMAL RESOLUTION (1985)
[hereinafter House OF DELEGATES FORMAL RESOLUTION].
11. Rule 45, which grants the court power to impose contempt sanctions, covers subpoenas ad
testificandum and subpoenas duces tecum.
12. HousE OF DELEGATES FORMAL RESOLUTION supra note 10.
13. See infra notes 18-41 and accompanying text.
14. See Infra notes 42-66 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 83-99 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
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means for compelling the disclosure of important information possessed
by nonparties.
I. PROBLEMS CREATED BY LIBERAL DISCOVERY AND RELEVANCY
REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
Although unretained experts ostensibly have the same duties as
other citizens to provide information that could be useful in resolving a
dispute,18 such experts also have a particularly strong interest in privacy.
Subpoenas have been challenged on the grounds that disclosure might
limit the expert's ability to conduct research, 19 cause the expert to be at a
competitive disadvantage, 20 or place the unwilling expert in an uncom-
fortable or controversial position. 2 In addition, the minimum compen-
sation required under the Federal Rules is insignificant compared to the
potential personal and professional costs of providing the information.22
The burden imposed on the expert witness differs from that imposed
on the nonexpert witness. The nonexpert witness has observed or partici-
pated in events leading to the litigation; the subpoenaed expert, in con-
trast, is being compelled to give opinion testimony or provide
information that is the product of professional efforts.P The expert also
is in a different position because his information, unlike that of a person
who actually observed or participated in the events at issue, often can be
supplied by someone else.
18. See e.g, United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) ("[P]ersons summoned as wit-
nesses by competent authority have certain minimum duties and obligations which are necessary
concessions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and judicial machinery.");
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932) ("[O]ne of the duties which the citizen owes to
his government is to support the administration of justice by attending its courts and giving his
testimony whenever he is properly summoned.").
19. See eg., Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985);
Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 740 F.2d 556, 559 (7th Cr. 1984); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672
F.2d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1982).
20. See, eg., In re J.A. Frates, No. M8-85 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1985) (available on Lexis,
Genfed library, Dist file); In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., No.
M8.85 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1983) (available on Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file); In re New York City
Mun. Sec. Litig., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 842, 842-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
21. Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 836 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir.), cerL
denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).
22. The Federal Rules require that a litigant tender to a witness subpoenaed for a deposition
"the fees for one day's attendance and the mileage allowed by law." FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c). The
witness fee is set at $30 per day. See 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (1982).
23. As one court pointed out, "[t]he expert not only suffers a loss of time from his or her job,
like an ordinary witness; he or she also suffers a loss in divulging dearly won expertise." In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Federal courts may use Rule 26 and Rule 45 to limit the informa-
tion obtainable from a nonparty or to construct protective measures to
reduce the burden imposed by a subpoena.24 Both rules allow courts
significant discretion when deciding whether to quash or restrict subpoe-
nas, though neither requires that courts consider a nonparty's expertise
or interest in the material sought. Furthermore, neither rule mandates
that the litigant pay the unretained expert fair compensation for the in-
formation provided.
Rule 45 enables a court to weigh, to a limited extent, the interests of
nonparties from whom evidence is sought. For example, Rule 45(b)(1)
permits a court to modify or quash unreasonable or oppressive subpoe-
nas.25 If the subpoenaed nonparty submits a timely objection to the
court, compliance is not required until the court rules on the motion.26
Furthermore, Rule 45(b)(2) allows a court to quash a subpoena if the
requesting party fails to advance the reasonable costs of producing the
documents.27
Rule 26 sets the general standards for discovery. Parties can dis-
cover "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject mat-
ter" of a pending action.28 The information sought need not be
admissible at trial as long as it "appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. ' 2 9 Rule 26 grants litigants liberal
discovery of documentary and other information,30 including discovery
aimed at nonparty witnesses through the subpoena process. Liberal dis-
covery, however, is tempered in some respects: the work product of law-
yers is protected and the discovery of information possessed by retained
experts is subject to certain restraints. 31 Yet neither the unretained ex-
24. See infra notes 25-27, 32-41.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1).
26. Id. 45(b).
27. Id. 45(b)(2).
28. Id. 26(b)(1).
29. Id.
30. The rule states in part that a party may obtain discovery regarding the "existence, descrip-
tion, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and
the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter." Z&. See C.
WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoURS § 81, at 543 (4th ed. 1983) ("The scope of discovery
contemplated by Rule 26 is extremely broad.").
31. Rule 26(b)(4) contains two standards: one for discovery from retained experts who are
expected to testify and one for discovery from retained experts who are not expected to testify. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(4). The rule, amended in 1970 to provide this protection for retained wit-
nesses, "reject[s] as ill-considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert information
within the work-product doctrine" and "adopt[s] a form of the more recently developed doctrine of
'unfairness."' See FED. P. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note (citing United States v. Mc-
Kay, 372 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1967), and United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593,
597 (D. Md. 1963)).
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pert's expertise nor his nonparty status imposes limits on the broad appli-
cability of Rule 26.
Recent amendments to Rule 26 do temper liberal discovery some-
what by giving courts authority to limit discovery on practical or equita-
ble grounds when a party abuses the process. 32 Under the amended rule,
a judge may limit requests that are unreasonably burdensome, expensive,
cumulative, or duplicative. 33 As a check, the amended rule requires at-
torneys to certify that discovery requests are made in good faith.34 It
also authorizes courts to impose sanctions for abuse of discovery.3 5
Moreover, Rule 26(c) allows a person to seek a protective order
when a discovery request is oppressive, unduly burdensome, or would
result in unnecessary expense.36  The rule, designed as a safeguard
against abuses of the almost unlimited right of discovery under Rule 26,
lists eight types of protective orders37 and allows courts to establish addi-
tional protections as justice requires. Persons seeking protective orders
must show good cause, 38 but courts have failed to develop a single stan-
dard for testing good cause. Some weigh the burden on the subpoenaed
party against the interests of the litigant, 39 while others require more
than a weighing of relative hardships.40 In any event, the protective or-
32. See FEv. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
33. Id
34. Id. 26(g)(I).
35. Id. 26(g).
36. Id. 26(c).
37. An order may provide:
(I) that the discovery not be had;
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specific terms and conditions, including a
designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected
by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited
to certain matters;(5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the
court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court;(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research development or commercial informa-
tion not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designed way; and(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in
sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
Id
38. Id.
39. See, eg., Farnsworth v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (1lth Cir. 1985);
Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 740 F.2d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 1984); Apicella v. McNeal Laborato-
ries, 66 F.R.D. 78, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
40. See, ag., General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1973). Good cause often requires a showing of specific and identifiable harm,
such as the likelihood of serious injury. See eg., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
529 F. Supp. 866, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1981). A showing that disclosure will cause "a clearly defined and
very serious injury" has also been required in at least one case. United States v. International Busi-
ness Machs. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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der must be narrowly drawn,41 and the nonparty expert who seeks a pro-
tective order will incur legal expenses in doing so.
In short, Rule 26 provides insufficient protection for the unretained
expert. Furthermore, the rule creates a double standard by protecting
the work of retained experts without extending similar protection to the
work of unretained experts.
11. THE CHAOTic JuDIciAL ATrEMPT TO DEFiNE PROTECTIONS
FOR NONPARTY EXPERTS
Courts have disagreed sharply over how to treat nonparty experts.
Even the fundamental question of whether the nonparty expert has an
intellectual property right in his information remains unresolved. One
judge, for example, has pointed out that an expert's knowledge is his
"stock in trade." 42 So viewed, compulsion to supply such information to
litigants may amount to a taking of property. Other judges have viewed
privileges and relevancy requirements as the only restraints on discovery
of information possessed by unretained experts.43 But the relevancy re-
quirement erects only a minor hurdle for litigants demanding such infor-
mation,44 and courts generally do not recognize a privilege for experts.45
In apparent acknowledgment of the unfairness of compelling experts
to comply with discovery or testimonial subpoenas, a host of tests have
been employed to provide nonparties, particularly nonparty experts, with
added protection. In Kaufman v. Edelstein, for example, Judge Friendly
presented a list of factors designed to assist trial courts in deciding
whether to compel expert testimony.46 In his view, trial courts should
consider the following:
the degree to which the expert is being called because of his knowledge
of facts relevant to the case rather than in order to give opinion testi-
mony; the difference between testifying to a previously formed or ex-
pressed opinion and forming a new one; the possibility that, for other
reasons, the witness is a unique expert; the extent to which the calling
41. See, ag., In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
42. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577,582 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). See also In
re Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., No. M8-85 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14,
1983) (available on Lexis, Genfed library, Dist file).
43. See, ag., United States v. International Business Machs. Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 105-06
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). Information is considered relevant if it is "reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence." FE. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
44. See C. WRiGHT, supra note 30, § 81, at 548-49.
45. See Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 820 (2d Cir. 1976). The court pointed out that it
perceived "no sufficient basis in principle or precedent for holding that the common law recognizes
any general privilege to withhold... expert knowledge." Mtd But see infra note 94 and accompany-
ing text.
46. Kaufman, 539 F.2d at 822.
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party is able to show the unlikelihood that any comparable witness will
willingly testify; the degree to which the witness is able to show that he
has been oppressed by having continually to testify.4 7
Judge Friendly proposed this solution as the "utmost" courts could do in
the absence of a privilege, statute, or controlling rule.48 However, he did
not indicate precisely how the factors were to be applied; not surpris-
ingly, no clear standard has emerged.
Two cases involving the same expert on jeep crash studies illustrate
this lack of consensus. In one case, Buchanan v. American Motors
Corp.,49 an automobile manufacturer defending against a wrongfi death
suit attempted to discover from an expert the research used to prepare a
study on vehicle safety.50 The district court found the subpoena unrea-
sonably burdensome, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that authority to quash based on the
expert's nonparty status rested within the discretion of the trial court.51
In an earlier case also arising in the Sixth Circuit, Wright v. Jeep
Corp., 52 the district court rejected an attempt by the same expert to in-
voke a privilege for academic research.5 3 The court required the expert
to comply with a subpoena almost identical to the one quashed in
Buchanan, 54 holding that the burden imposed was no different from that
placed on any person who acquires knowledge relevant to an issue in
contention.55 The court then invoked its power under Rule 45(b) to re-
quire the defendant to pay the expert a reasonable fee, costs, and a por-
tion of expenses for his research.5 6
These contrary holdings involving the same expert and information
sought for identical purposes illustrate the substantial potential for capri-
ciousness in the application of protections afforded unretained nonparty
experts. The courts have not shown a willingness to develop a uniform
standard. Some courts considering motions to quash have given weight
47. Id
48. Id
49. 697 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1983).
50. Id at 151. The automobile manufacturer sought discovery from the expert because it antic-
ipated that the plaintiff would "use the research study as one basis for expressing an adverse expert
opinion about the safety" of its jeeps. Id at 152.
51. Id The court also noted that compliance with the subpoena "would require the expert who
has no direct connection with the litigation to spend many days testifying and disclosing all of the
raw data, including thousands of documents, accumulated over the course of a long and detailed
research study." Id
52. 547 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
53. Id. at 875. The court also rejected the expert's claim that his status as an unretained expert
gave him a right to refuse to testify. Id at 874.
54. Id. at 877.
55. Id. at 876.
56. IK at 877.
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to the nonparty status of the person subpoenaed.5 7 Other courts have
required the party seeking information from the nonparty to guaranty
reasonable compensation58 or show a substantial need for the informa-
tion.59 Still other courts have held that certain experts have a qualified
privilege as researchers or have first amendment rights relating to aca-
demic freedom.0
Additionally, various state courts have developed a host of criteria
for deciding whether or when an unretained expert must comply with a
subpoena in a civil action.61 And it is probably not possible to identify all
the approaches actually used by federal judges because reported discov-
ery decisions often follow appeals of unreported magistrates' orders.
In sum, no uniform court standard defines when a nonparty expert
57. See, eg., Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1983). But see
Cantaline v. Raymark Indus., 103 F.R.D. 447, 452 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (party and nonparty alike owe
duty of obedience to court).
58. See, eg., United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 666 F.2d 364, 371-72 (9th Cir. 1982)
(litigant can be ordered to reimburse nonparty for discovery costs); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577, 581-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (expert's entitlement to a reasonable fee arises
under common law precedent and the court's authority under FED. R. Civ. P. 1); Wright v. Jeep
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 871, 877 (ED. Mich. 1982) (defendant not seeking benefits of nonparty's infor-
mation must advance reasonable fee).
59. See, ag., Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 740 F.2d 556, 565 (7th Cir. 1984); EEOC v.
University of Notre Dame Du Lao, 715 F.2d 331, 338 (7th Cir. 1983); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672
F.2d 1262, 1272-73 (7th Cir. 1982); Centurion Indus., Inc. v. Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 326
(10th Cir. 1981); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Otte, 474 F.2d 529, 536-37 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 929 (1973); New York State Energy Research and Dev. Auth. v. Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc., 36
Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1511, 1519 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); City ofGroton v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 84
F.R.D. 420, 422 (D. Conn. 1979). Brit see Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326, 333 (D.RP.
1976) (only relevancy and necessity need be shown); Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co.,
288 F. Supp. 708, 717 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (same).
60. See, eg., Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 740 F.2d 556,560-65 (7th Cir. 1984) (recogniz-
ing the possibility of a qualified privilege for researchers); Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262,
1276-77 (7th Cir. 1982) (For present purposes, our point is simply that ... interest in academic
freedom may properly figure into the legal calculation of whether forced disclosure would be reason-
able."); Lampshire v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 94F.R.D. 58,60 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (acknowledging that
public health research often involves confidential information that should be protected from disclo-
sure); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
("Compelled disclosure of confidential information would without question severely stifle research
into questions of public policy ... "); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78, 84-85
(ED.N.Y. 1975) (denying discovery of unpublished, underlying research for article published in
medical newsletter because of need to protect confidential sources). But see In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d
426,427 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) (refusing to recognize "academic freedom" privilege for univer-
sity professor subpoenaed to provide information regarding vote on promotion of colleague); Grum-
man Aerospace Corp. v. Titantium Metals Corp., 91 F.R.D. 84, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (fact that
consulting firm entered into confidentiality agreements would not prevent compulsion ofinformation
prepared by that firm).
61. See, ag., Mason v. Robinson, 340 N.W.2d 236, 242 (Iowa 1983) (substantial necessity must
be shown); Fenlon v. Thayer, 127 N.IL 702,707,506 A.2d 319,322 (1986) (rule favoring testimonial
compulsion should apply to all experts); see also infra note 94.
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will be required to submit to a subpoena.62 Inconsistent decisions are
disturbing because they frustrate one of the purposes of having rules of
procedure. Procedural systems should treat like cases alike.63
The problem of inconsistency in applying the federal rules to expert
witnesses is not new. A similar problem existed not long ago with re-
spect to retained expert witnesses. Before 1970, the federal courts applied
a number of different tests to determine whether compulsion would be
proper.64 One contemporary commentator observed that "no sound
body of coherently related propositional law is deducible from the cases,
nor have general standards employed by various courts yet fumished an
adequate method of attack in this 'hazy frontier of the discovery pro-
cess.' "6 Rulemakers addressed this absence of a uniform standard by
revising Rule 26(b)(4) to restrict discovery of information possessed by
retained experts. 66
III. CONTROLLING THE SUBPOENA PROCESS
Some may argue that the nonparty expert witness has at least two
potential remedies against the litigant who abuses the subpoena process.
First, the nonparty expert might bring an abuse of process action against
the subpoenaing party. Second, he might seek sanctions under Rule 11.
As explained below, however, neither of these remedies is adequate.
A. Abuse of Process Actions.
Tort relief for abuse of process might be seen as one way to deter
some abusive subpoenas.67 One may bring an abuse of process action
62. See, ag., Stein, OralDepositions in Federal CivilPractice, in PRAc rIcNG LAW INSTITUTE,
DEPOSITIONS, EXPERT WITNESSES, AND DEMONSTRATVE EVIDENCE IN PERSONAL INJURY
CASES 9, 38 (1985); Comment, Compelling Experts to Testify: A Proposal, 44 U. CH. L. Rsv. 851,
851 (1977). Some recent cases on the matter are collected in Annotation, Rights of Independent
Expert to Refuse to Testf as to Expert Opinion, 50 A.L.R. 4th 680 (1986).
63. See Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 611 (1985) ('C]onsistency is
the systematic analogue of the impartiality feature demanded of individual decisionmakers.").
64. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
65. Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 111,
119 (1965). See also Bartell, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, in RE.
SOURCE MATERIALS: CiviL PRAcTcE AND LITIGATION IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 445,
557 (3d ed. 1985) (describing the confused state of the law prior to the 1970 amendment).
66. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
67. See generally Annotation, Abuse of Process Action Based on Misuse of Discovery or Deposi-
tion Procedures After Commencement of Civil Action Without Seizure of Person or Property, 33
A.L.R. 4th 650, 651-54 (1984) (collecting state court decisions on abuse of process actions based on
misuse of discovery or deposition procedures). For the argument that tort actions sbould not be
used to control litigation abuse because they are too costly and time-consuming, see Underwood,
Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Control of Adversary Ethics-!The Model Rules of-Professional
Conduct and Proposed Amendments to the Rulcs of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 625, 629
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against a party who causes harm by using a legal process to accomplish a
purpose for which that process was not designed. 68 In order to sustain a
cause of action, the plaintiff must show that the defendant made an im-
proper or perverted use of the process with an ulterior motive or
purpose.69
The plaintiff must overcome substantial obstacles. Given the liberal-
ity of modem discovery rules, it will often be difficult to establish im-
proper motive. Additionally, the plaintiff must confront the view that
"our adversarial system cannot function without zealous advocacy" 70
and the practical desuetude of the tort.71 Some jurisdictions require a
showing that the wrongful use of process resulted in the seizure of the
plaintiff's property.72 Moreover, an action typically cannot exist until the
case in which the alleged abuse occurred has been resolved.73 Given
these hurdles, the possibility of relief on this basis offers scant comfort to
the nonparty expert witness.
B. Rule 11 Sanctions.
Because Rule 1 174 sanctions are directed at the source of abusive
litigation practices, they represent a limited way to protect nonparty ex-
(1982). Underwood asserts that "the burden resulting from abuse of litigation can only be relieved
by changes which foster stronger judicial control of adversarial ethics, and greater judicial involve-
ment in the pretrial stages of litigation." d
68. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977).
69. W. KEETON, D. DoBBS, R. KEETON & D. OwEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 121, at 897-98 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]. However, "even a pure
spite motive is not sufficient where process is issued only to accomplish the result for which it was
created." Rd at 897.
70. Board ofEduc. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397,405,343 N.E.2d
278, 283, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 643 (1975).
71. Id. at 400, 343 N.E.2d at 280, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 638. Farmingdale contains a detailed dis-
cussion of the history of the tort. d at 400-03, 343 N.E.2d at 28082, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 639-42.
72. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 69, § 121, at 900. An attorney is liable to a third party
for abuse of process only ifhe maliciously participates or encourages and induces another to commit
an act constituting an abuse. See Annotation, Civil Liability of Attorney for Abuse of Process 97
A.L.R.3d 688, 690-95 (1980).
73. See, eg., Steele v. Morris, 608 F. Supp. 274, 276 (S.D.W. Va. 1985).
74. The Rule states in part;
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record .... A party who is not represented by an
attorney shall sign his pleading, motion or other paper .... The signature of an attorney
or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper;, that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existiug law or a good faith argn-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost oflitigation.... Ifa pleading, motion, or other paper is signed
in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
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perts. Unlike tort relief, Rule 11 sanctions are available without proof of
malice.75
There is some precedent for applying sanctions to protect the inter-
ests of nonparties. In Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc.,76 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Rule 11
applied to nonlitigants subpoenaed for a deposition 77 The court imposed
Rule 11 sanctions on a party for invoking an ungrounded citation for
contempt against a nonparty, former CIA Director Richard Helms,7 af-
ter he refused to sit for a videotaped deposition even though both parties
in the suit apparently had an "informal understanding" that Helms's
deposition would be taped.79
Westmoreland thus indicates that nonparty witnesses have rights be-
yond those agreed to by the parties and may seek sanctions under some
circumstances. Nonetheless, Rule 11 may prove to be of little value to
subpoenaed unretained experts. The text of Rule 11 does not mention
misuse of subpoenas, which are signed by clerks rather than a party's
counsel.80 Broadening the sanction provision in Rule 11 to cover the
misuse of subpoenas might be desirable. Whether rulemakers will
change Rule 11 in light of their recent overhaul of that rule remains an
open question.3' In any event, the role of sanctions, particularly financial
sanctions imposed against lawyers, remains controversial. 82
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
75. The revised rule has replaced a vague good faith standard with one requiring something
closer to objective reasonableness. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note; see also
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[The] language of
the new Rule 11 explicitly and unambiguously imposes an affirmative duty on each attorney to
conduct a reasonable inquiry into the viability of a pleading before it is signed. Simply put, subjec-
tive good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did."). But see Gieringer v. Silverman, 731
F.2d 1272, 1281 (7th Cir. 1984) (requiring a showing of subjective bad faith before imposing
sanctions).
76. 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 1178. The significance ofthis ruling is that it extended Rule 11 sanctions to nonparty
victims ofdiscovery abuse. Id at 1180. The subpoenaed individual's expertise was not mentioned as
a factor in the ruling, even though CBS apparently subpoenaed him because ofhis specialized knowl-
edge as director of the CIA from 1966 to 1973. Id at 1170-71. Moreover, the court did not rule
that CBS could not depose the individual.
78. Id at 1180.
79. d at 1171, 1180. According to the Federal Rules, "[t]he parties may stipulate in writing
or the court may upon motion order that the testimony at a deposition be recorded by other than
stenographic means." FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b)(4). No such stipulation or order existed in this case,
though Helms did agree to be deposed. Westmoreland, 770 F.2d at 1171.
80. See supra note 74.
81. Rule 11 was last amended in 1983. See FED. R. Cir. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
82. Critics of broad application of sanctions argue that sanctions not only threaten to create
satellite litigation but also can inhibit lawyers' creativity and possibly chill settlements by destroying
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IV. ACCOMODATION THROUGH AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. The ABA's ProposaL
In 1985, the ABA House of Delegates recommended that Rule 45 be
amended to address the problems associated with subpoenas issued to
unretained experts.8 3 The resolution made the following proposals:
1. That there be a limitation in the amount of expense in time
and money required of a non-party witness complying with a subpoena
and that any order of reimbursement of a non-party witness be pro-
spective only.
2. That a non-party witness be afforded protection under Rules
26, 29 and 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. That the time limits for compliance with a subpoena by a
non-party witness be at least the same as for a party.
4. That a party and non-party witness be given standing to ob-
ject to the issuance of a subpoena.
5. That a non-party witness be given standing to object to the
scope of discovery.
6. That documents in the control of a witness in one district be
produced in response to a subpoena properly served upon a witness in
another district.
7. That a non-party expert witness should not be required to
give opinion testimony without compensation.
8. That sanctions upon a non-party withness [sic] under Rule 45
comport with the sanctions upon a party under Rule 37.
9. That the procedures of Rules 45(b), (d) and (f) be changed as
to the timing of a motion for the objection, after the failure to move
under Rule 45(b) and as to the failure to object and/or appear or pro-
duce pursuant to Rule 45(d).84
These principles only partially enhance protections for nonparty ex-
perts. Chiefly, the recommendations clarify rights already existing under
the Federal Rules and encourage equitable treatment of parties and non-
parties. In concrete terms, he proposed amendment corrects an inequity
in the present rules by requiring that nonparties be given as much time to
object to subpoenas as parties. The main value to subpoenaed nonparty
experts, though, stems from the new standard for prospective compensa-
tion, the emphasis on limiting the burdens imposed on nonparties, and
the recognition of the importance of opinion testimony.
In sum, these proposals require that special consideration be given
to the particular concerns of nonparty experts. Still, the ABA recom-
a cooperative atmosphere. Se eg., Weiss, A Practioners' Commentary on the Actual Use of
Amended Rule 11, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 23-24 (1985).
83. See HousE oF DELEGATES FORMAL RESOLUTION, supra note 10.
84. Id. at 1-2.
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mendation does not go far enough. Most unretained experts will suffer
harm unassociated with monetary considerations. For example, mone-
tary compensation cannot cure the professional harm caused by the dis-
closure of certain kinds of information. Monetary compensation also is
not necessarily an adequate solution when the information can be ob-
tained from another source. The ABA proposal therefore only partially
weighs the interest of the nonparty expert against the litigant's needs.
Deitchman v. E.K Squibb & Sons, Inc. 85 is representative of cases
suggesting that monetary compensation might not be nearly as important
as other considerations to some uretained experts.86 E.R. Squibb &
Sons, a pharmaceutical company involved in a product liability suit,
sought production of documents from a registry managed by Arthur L.
Herbst, chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the
University of Chicago. 87 In order to monitor clinical, pathological, and
epidemiological aspects of a genital tract disease known as clear-cell ade-
nocarcinoma, Herbst established a registry in 1972 to keep statistics on
his research findings.88 The registry's goals included determining the in-
cidence of the disease, discovering the relationship between prenatal
treatment and other factors possibly influencing the occurrence of the
disease, and determining the best means of treatment8 9
Herbst was a nonparty to the lawsuit and the possibility of inade-
quate compensation for disclosure was not an issue because Squibb
pledged to pay any expense that discovery required.90 Herbst feared,
however, that disclosure would jeopardize his research by forcing the ter-
mination of a study begun in 1969 and later used as the basis for the
registry.91 The court remanded the case for a reconsideration of the mo-
tion to quash the subpoena, noting that "[Squibb] appears to concede
that the loss of confidentiality here will adversely affect the Registry and
that, as the district judge stated, 'all society will be the poorer... [and] a
unique and vital resource for learning about the incidence, causes and
treatment of adenocarcinoma will be lost.' ",92
85. 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
86. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
87. Deitchman, 740 F.2d at 558.
88. IM
89. IM
90. Id. at 560.
91. IM at 558-59.
92. IM at 560. Both the trial court and the court of appeals used balancing tests, arguably
extending the requirements of the Federal Rules. The court of appeals balanced the drug company's
need for information to present an adequate defense against the harm that compliance with the
subpeona would cause to Herbst's registry. MkL at 559. The court held that "discovery should be no
more intrusive than is necessary to avoid a miscarriage ofjustice. Anything not necessary must be
viewed as covered by privilege." Mk at 565. The trial court had quashed the subpoena on the
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The ABA's recommendation that Rule 45 be amended to guaranty
experts prospective compensation for testimony,93 while itself insuffi-
dent, does suggest that the rules of procedure can guide courts in ac-
comodating the conflicting interests of litigants and nonparty experts.
By viewing the conflict essentially in financial terms, however, the propo-
sal fails to ensure equitable consideration of the nonparty expert's unique
position.
B. The Privilege ProposaL
One way to enhance protections for subpoenaed unretained experts
would be for rulemakers to extend a privilege that would preclude the
subpoenaing of opinion information or testimony. Although some state
courts have adopted such a privilege, 94 federal courts view such common
law privileges skeptically 95 and generally have been reluctant to expand
the scope of privileges in recent years. 96 Moreover, Congress has been
unwilling to standardize certain common law privileges through the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence,97 and the advisory notes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure explicitly reject the notion that a privilege should attach
to expertise.98
Even if such a privilege were feasible, it would be undesirable on
policy grounds. Eliminating all opportunities to discover or introduce
evidence that may be crucial to a lawsuit would be drastic in light of the
"enormous range of 'expert' knowledge in modem life." 99
C. The Work-Product Standard.
The scope of the qualified immunity provided by the work-product
grounds that the drug company's need for the information was speculative and the interest in de-
fending itself was outweighed by the danger that the disclosure of confidential information would
jeopardize the research project and similar projects. Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 502-03
(N.D. Ill. 1983), vacated, Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984).
93. See supra note 12 and accompanying text
94. See, eg., Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 235, 327 N.E.2d 819, 827 (1975); Peo-
ple ex reL Kraushaar Bros. & Co. v. Thorpe, 296 N.Y. 223, 225, 72 N.E.2d 165, 165.66 (1947).
95. See note 45 and accompanying text.
96. See S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL- A COM-
PLetE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 347 (4th ed. 1986).
97. In 1971, Congress rejected a recommendation to codify certain privileges under federal law.
M. at 331.
98. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
99. Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811, 820 (2d Cir. 1976). As Judge Friendly pointed out,
"[t]o clothe all such expert testimony with privilege solely on the basis that the expert 'owns' his
knowledge... would be to seal of too much evidence important to the just determination of dis-
putes." Id at 821.
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doctrine has expanded steadily.104 As formulated in Hickman v. Tay-
lor, 10' the doctrine provides a qualified immunity from discovery for any
notes, working papers, memoranda, or similar materials prepared by an
attorney in anticipation of litigation.10 2 It is designed to give an attorney
freedom to investigate all aspects of a case without fear of having to turn
over the material to opposing counsel. 10 3 Such material, however, does
not receive absolute protection. As one commentator notes:
Information that is collected in anticipation of litigation or trial is pro-
tected from discovery, but that protection may yield to a showing of
need on the part of the requesting party. Mental impressions of the
attorney enjoy the highest level of protection under the work-product
doctrine, but... even they may be revealed, at least in part, upon a
sufficient showing. Thus, the application of the work-product rule
often requires a balancing of the competing needs of the parties, as well
as an inquiry into whether the material involved properly falls within
the concerns that originally produced this discovery excepion.'0
A party seeking discovery must demonstrate two things when the
opposing side invokes the work-product doctrine. First, the party must
show a substantial need for the material.' 0 5 Second, the party must show
an inability to obtain the information elsewhere without undue hard-
ship.10 6 Determining whether to allow discovery of information pro-
tected by the work-product doctrine thus depends largely on the
availability of the material sought.107
The standard proposed here is modeled after this doctrine. As ap-
plied to the unretained expert, the proposed standard would require the
litigant to show a substantial need for the material and an inability to
obtain the material or testimony elsewhere without undue hardship. In
addition, in accord with the ABA recommendation, the subpoenaing
party would be required to provide the nonparty with reasonable com-
pensation on a prospective basis.
A court should conclude that the subpoenaed information is not
available elsewhere if the subpoenaing party shows that it has exhausted
all reasonable efforts to obtain it. This showing would require an affirtma-
100. Under the work-product doctrine, material prepared by one party or for one party's repre-
sentative is protected from discovery, unless the party seeking it can show a substantial need for the
information and is unable to obtain it elsewhere without undue hardship. FED. IL CIv. P. 26(b)(3).
For a discussion of the development of the doctrine, see Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine? Protec-
tion, Not Privilege, 71 GEO. L.. 917, 943 (1983).
101. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
102. See 3. FRIEDENTHAI, M. KANE & A. MLLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.5, at 386-87 (1985).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 387.
105. FED. P Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
106. Id.
107. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 30, § 82, at 556.
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tive act on the part of the subpoenaing party that may vary depending on
the circumstances of the litigation. The party might, for example, be
required to seek comparable information from other experts. In other
cases, a court might require the party to attempt to duplicate the re-
search with his own resources.
Of course, this proposal will not solve every problem. Like any bal-
ancing standard, it cannot be applied mechanically. But the limited flexi-
bility of the proposed rule is also one of its strengths. Within clear limits,
designed to enhance fairness and consistency in the subpoenaing process,
judges could weigh the relative burdens imposed on litigants and nonpar-
ties. 108 Although the relevant considerations will vary from case to case,
the proposed standard would limit judicial discretion and narrow the
wide discrepancies that result from the application of present standards.
- V. CONCLUSION
The ABA and a number of judges recognize that nonparty experts
subpoenaed to provide information or testimony based on their expertise
should be accorded protection from unfair appropriation of their special
knowledge. No clear standard to ensure consideration of the interests of
experts compelled to provide information has emerged, however. More-
over, there is little chance that courts will develop a consistent, equitable
standard under the current versions of Rules 45 and 26.
The ABA has recognized the problem and has proposed that Rule
45 be amended. This note has argued that the ABA proposal would do
little to resolve the problem. Accordingly, the note proposes that Rule
45 be amended to provide specific protection for nonparty experts com-
parable to that available to attorneys under the work-product doctrine.
The amended rule would clarify the standards applicable to subpoenaing
nonparty experts and curtail the confusion and inconsistent treatment of
nonparty experts. Moreover, it would be in accord with the emphasis on
fairness mandated by the Federal Rules and with the goal of encouraging
liberal access to relevant information.
Mark Labaton
108. In addition, other societal interests may be considered. For example, Judge Edelstein based
his decision to uphold subpeonas to two nonparty computer experts in one case in part on the impor-
tance that the case had for the nation. See United States v. International Business Machs. Corp.,
406 F. Supp. 175, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (describing "major government antitrust" case as one which
"greatly affects the commonweal"), appeal dismLvsed sub. nom. Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811
(2d Cir 1976).
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